

Rogue Nation Relations Disadvantage

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Summary: Doing things that Russia doesn't like pushes them into closer relations with rogue nations like Iran and North Korea, which is bad for global security.

See also the similar North Korean Destabilization disadvantage (page 353) and Relations With Russia - Important (page 121).

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GENERAL LINKS: THINGS THAT HURT US-RUSSIA RELATIONS

See also Relations With Russia – Important (page 121) for a few more cards.

Laundry list: Unilateralism; ignoring Russian interests, international law, and the UN

Ariel Cohen (PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, member of the Council on Foreign Relations), June 27, 2007, Heritage Foundation, "How to Confront Russia's Anti-American Foreign Policy", <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/06/How-to-Confront-Russias-Anti-American-Foreign-Policy>

Putin's list of grievances against the United States and the West is long. His main complaints are that the American "hyperpower" is pursuing its own unilateral foreign, defense, cultural, and economic policy while ignoring Russian interests, disregarding international law, and ignoring the U.N., where Russia has a veto on the Security Council. Former French President Jacques Chirac would be proud, but Russia takes its opposition much farther than France ever did.

GENERAL LINKS: ALIENATING RUSSIA

Anger with US pushes Russia toward rogue nations

Stephen J. Blank (PhD in history, Strategic Studies Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989), February 16, 2005, Jamestown Foundation, "WILL VENEZUELA SEND RUSSIAN WEAPONS TO SOUTH AMERICAN TERRORISTS?", http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27560

While Russia may claim that its main enemy is terrorism, in fact it continues, much like its Soviet predecessor, to become a sponsor of other states who sponsor terrorism, just so it can display its anger with Washington. While it gains dollars and a rather limited influence over these customers, can it really be said that the Russian national interest is well served by such deals?

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Ignoring Russian interests pushes Russia toward China and other countries

Prof. Rajan Menon (PhD in political science, professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, fellow at the New America Foundation), 2009, The Century Foundation, "The China-Russia Relationship: What It Involves, Where It Is Headed, and How It Matters for the United States", <http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/Menon.pdf> (page 17)

The common theme that ties these specific areas of agreement together is a shared antipathy to a unipolar world, that is, one that permits a particular state that has amassed unprecedented power (the United States, obviously) to ride roughshod over the objections and interests of others. The appropriate response to such a challenge in Moscow and Beijing's view is for other governments to organize a multipolar order, in which new centers of power counterbalance the lone superpower, or "hegemon."

Insensitivity to Russian interests pushes them to ally with rogues

Justin Logan (Master in International Relations from University of Chicago, associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) and Ted Galen Carpenter (PhD in U.S. diplomatic history, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), 2009, Cato Institute, "Cato Handbook for Policymakers 7th edition", <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-53.pdf>

Moscow's growing flirtation with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, an obnoxious nemesis of the United States, is also creating gratuitous tensions. Moscow's joint air and naval exercises with Venezuelan military forces in September 2008 especially did not improve relations with America. Those moves likely reflect mounting Russian anger at U.S. policies that seem calculated to undermine Russia's influence in its own backyard and even humiliate Moscow.

[later, in the same context]

Russian leaders are also showing Washington that Moscow can exploit the Kosovo precedent for its own purposes. That became all too evident in August 2008, when Russia repulsed an attempt by the government of neighboring Georgia to reestablish military and political control over the secessionist region of South Ossetia. Moscow launched a full-scale military counteroffensive against Georgian forces and penetrated deeply into Georgian territory. The Kremlin followed up that move by recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another secessionist region. Unfortunately, instead of beating a graceful diplomatic retreat, the United States has responded with further meddling, dispatching a humanitarian aid mission, providing Georgia with \$1 billion in reconstruction aid, and redoubling its lobbying efforts on behalf of admitting Georgia (and Ukraine) to NATO. One could scarcely imagine an issue with less relevance to genuine American interests than the political status of two obscure regions in a small country on Russia's border. Likewise, it is difficult to imagine what genuine Russian interests justify Moscow's bid to forge closer ties with the likes of Cuba and Venezuela.

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Weak US-Russian relations embolden rogue nations

Paul J. Saunders (MA in Political Science and MA in Russian and East European Studies, Executive Director of The Nixon Center, former Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs), June 1, 2003, Hoover Institution, Policy Review, "The U.S. and Russia After Iraq", No. 119, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6536>

Yet the relationship remains one of considerable importance to American national interests. The Kremlin's cooperation in the war in Afghanistan - in sharing intelligence, stepping up its preexisting effort to arm the Northern Alliance, and setting aside earlier objections to a major U.S. military presence in the region - significantly aided U.S. forces in the field. And a strong and sustainable relationship with Moscow can serve important and even vital American interests in many other areas, ranging from the war on terrorism to non-proliferation and international trade and investment. Conversely, a weak relationship with Russia could embolden "rogue states" hostile to the United States, return the United Nations Security Council to its Cold War uselessness, and expose Americans to additional danger from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

IRAN

Link: Sidelining Russian interests pushes Russia toward Iran

Lionel Beehner (PhD candidate in political science at Yale, a 2010 Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, former writer for Council on Foreign Relations), November 1, 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, "Russia, Iran: Brothers in Arms", http://www.cfr.org/publication/11873/russia_iran.html

Brenda Shaffer of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy calls Russia and Iran "partners in need," motivated mainly by three ends: curbing U.S. influence, maintaining a multipolar world, and undermining U.S. efforts to sideline both states (take, for example, the new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which skirts both Iran and Russia). Yet Michael Eisenstadt, writing in Arms Control Today, says cooperation between the two countries "is driven as much by fear and mistrust as it is by opportunism and shared interests." Regardless, closer Russia-Iran ties pose challenges to peace in the Middle East, analysts say, especially if Iran goes nuclear over the next decade.

Link: US coercion pushes Russia toward Iran

Andrew J. Grotto (JD, senior adviser to Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, former senior analyst at the Center for American Progress), September 28, 2007, Center for American Progress, "Building a Case Against Iran", <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/09/iran.html>

The United States must continue to oppose Russia's sales of conventional weapons to Iran. But Russia's increasingly assertive, and at times belligerent, behavior in the past several years ought to dispel any hope that holding up a nuclear cooperation agreement will coerce a fundamental change in its Iran policy. Rather, such a transparent attempt by the United States to economically coerce it would strengthen the hand of hardliners in Moscow who reject Russian cooperation with the United States and see Iran as an important tactical ally in the Middle East.

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Impact: Threatens efforts to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons

Lionel Beehner (PhD candidate in political science at Yale, a 2010 Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, former writer for Council on Foreign Relations), November 1, 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, "Russia, Iran: Brothers in Arms", http://www.cfr.org/publication/11873/russia_iran.html

The burgeoning partnership between Iran and Russia threatens to unravel UN efforts to squeeze Tehran to forego its nuclear ambitions. A veto-wielding member of the Security Council, Russia has thus far resisted efforts to punish the Iranians for forging ahead with their enrichment activities and ignoring a raft of UN resolutions.

A/T "Russia Imposing Sanctions": Russia watered the sanctions down

June 25, 2010, Voice of America (prominent news source), "Analysts Say Iran-Russia Relations Worsening", <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Analysts-Say-Iran-Russia-Relations-Worsening--97172974.html>

To show its displeasure with Iran, experts say Moscow voted in favor of a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing new, tougher sanctions on Tehran - although the text was apparently watered down by Russia and China.

A/T "Russia Imposing Sanctions": Only to prevent US-Israeli military action

Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (MA in International Policy Studies, with distinction, from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, research associate and NPT project manager at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies), quoted by Voice of America, June 25, 2010, Voice of America (prominent news source), "Analysts Say Iran-Russia Relations Worsening", <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Analysts-Say-Iran-Russia-Relations-Worsening--97172974.html>

Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, with Monterey's Center for Nonproliferation Studies [California], says Russian officials have other reasons for agreeing to sanctions on Iran. "They want also to make sure that the United States and Israel do not feel cornered into taking military action. I think that's Russia's primary interest right now - to on the one hand deliver a message to Iran that they will not support them unequivocally, and on the other hand not allow the military action to go forward," said Mukhatzhanova.

CHINA

Link: Tension with Russia = push Russia to China

John Gordon IV (PhD in public policy from George Mason University, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND) and others, 2008, RAND Corporation, "Domestic Trends in the United States, China, and Iran", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG729.pdf (page 152)

Although remote at this time, it is possible that Russia and China could significantly strengthen their geostrategic and military ties. This move would likely stem from a serious downward trend in each country's relations with the United States. This downturn could be prompted in large part by increased tension with the United States over each country's near abroad (for example, Ukraine and Taiwan).

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Link: Interfering in Russian sphere pushes Russia to China

Prof. Michael Smith (Professor of European Politics at Loughborough University, co-director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and the Centre for the Study of International Governance at Loughborough) and Prof. Richard Little (PhD, Professor of Politics at University of Bristol, member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 2006, "Perspectives on World Politics", <http://books.google.com/books?id=tWZN2Yos2mEC>

Rather than learning from history, the United States is repeating past errors by extending its influence over what used to be the province of the vanquished. This alienates Russia and nudges it toward China instead of drawing it toward Europe and the United States.

Link Extender: Russia-China-Iran alliance = magnet for other US enemies

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya (Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) specializing in geopolitics and strategic issues), September 23, 2007, "The Sino-Russian Alliance: Challenging America's Ambitions in Eurasia", <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6688>

[Prof. Zbigniew] Brzezinski goes on to say that the Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition, which he moreover calls an "antiestablishmentarian [anti-establishmentarian] coalition," could "be a potent magnet for other states [e.g., Venezuela] dissatisfied with the [global] status quo."

Brink: Without action, we will lose Russia to China

Peter Brookes (MA in government, doctoral candidate at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Fellow for Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation), August 15, 2005, Heritage Foundation, "An Alarming Alliance: Sino-Russian Ties Tightening", <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2005/08/An-Alarming-Alliance-Sino-Russian-Ties-Tightening>

More importantly, they signal the first real post-Cold War steps, beyond inflammatory rhetoric, by Russia and China to balance - and, ultimately, diminish - U.S. power across Asia. If America doesn't take strategic steps to counter these efforts, it will lose influence to Russia and China in an increasingly important part of the world.

Brink Example: Russia-China relations increasing

John Gordon IV (PhD in public policy from George Mason University, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND) and others, 2008, RAND Corporation, "Domestic Trends in the United States, China, and Iran", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG729.pdf (page 151)

Traditionally strained bilateral relations between Russia and China have experienced considerable improvements in recent years. In 2005, both countries solved remaining border disputes over territories in Russia's far east. They also held several joint military exercises in 2005 and 2007, the last of which-"Peace Mission-2007"-took place in China's Xinjiang region and then in Russia's Ural Mountains. Moreover, China and Russia collaborate through the SCO, which has become a major vehicle to limit U.S. (and EU) influence in both countries' near abroad.

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Impact: Hegemony loss

Boris Ryvkin (student in political science at Brown University and a researcher in Hudson's Center for Future Security Strategies), July 28, 2006, Hudson Institute, "China's Dangerous Ascent and Russia's Response", http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4140

Chinese military doctrine sees war with the "US hegemonists" as inevitable and seeks dominance by indirect conflict. The aim is to push the US out of the Pacific Rim and the Far East by coercion and provocation. The consensus among the general staff seems to be that the US will not fight over Taiwan, and a weakening of US influence in Japan and South Korea is only a matter of time. A confused US response over North Korea and a not so favorable situation in Iraq only fuel Chinese assessment of the US as a paper tiger. The great Sun Tzu argued that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," and it is clear the Chinese are making the most of this maxim. Of its 24 neighboring states, China has territorial claims to at least 11 and has used its demographic advantage to push into Siberia; this places the rising giant on a possible collision course with a still not fully recovered former giant: Russia.

[Note: For impacts to hegemony loss, see the Hegemony disadvantage, page 323.]

Impact: Chinese hegemony

Boris Ryvkin (student in political science at Brown University and a researcher in Hudson's Center for Future Security Strategies), July 28, 2006, Hudson Institute, "China's Dangerous Ascent and Russia's Response", http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4140

Through an artificial pricing of exports, the closure of their domestic market to Western business, and the systematic reduction of labor wages, the Chinese have engaged in a dangerously one-sided trading game with their international partners. The aim has not been the expansion of human rights and democratization, but a determined effort to achieve global hegemony.

Impact: Spread of Communism

Boris Ryvkin (student in political science at Brown University and a researcher in Hudson's Center for Future Security Strategies), July 28, 2006, Hudson Institute, "China's Dangerous Ascent and Russia's Response", http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4140

The Chinese Communist Party has undergone a transformation of means, but not purpose. The era of Mao Zedong's land reforms, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution have given way to Hu Jintao's more temperate but no less lethal Communist dictatorship. The Mao era led to the deaths or imprisonment of over 70 million Chinese, a crippling of the agricultural sector, and a decimation of China's intellectuals. Having declared his regime one of "true" Communism, Mao dreamed of Chinese dominance across Eurasia.

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Bottom Line: US-Russia cooperation essential to counter Chinese threat (1)

Boris Ryvkin (student in political science at Brown University and a researcher in Hudson's Center for Future Security Strategies), July 28, 2006, Hudson Institute, "China's Dangerous Ascent and Russia's Response", http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4140

Of its 24 neighboring states, China has territorial claims to at least 11 and has used its demographic advantage to push into Siberia; this places the rising giant on a possible collision course with a still not fully recovered former giant: Russia. To effectively handle the Chinese threat, Russia is essential. It has diverged in post-Communist development from its eastern neighbor, has serious concerns about its role in the international system, and retains a sizable nuclear arsenal.

Bottom Line: US-Russia cooperation essential to counter Chinese threat (2)

Boris Ryvkin (student in political science at Brown University and a researcher in Hudson's Center for Future Security Strategies), July 28, 2006, Hudson Institute, "China's Dangerous Ascent and Russia's Response", http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4140

The Chinese seek global dominance, while the US wants to keep the status quo (which leaves Russia fully in control of its sovereign territory). Building security and economic relations with the Chinese may seem logical from the perspective of a Russia following the Lavrov non-alignment formula, but illogical in a Russia committed to maintaining long-term relevance and sovereignty. Our greatest hope, both for a secure US and a stable Russia, lies in Menges' words gaining more traction within our old rival's policy circles.

Extension: Nuke power projection

John Tkacik, Jr. (MA from Harvard, retired diplomat who served overseas with the U.S. Foreign Service in Taiwan, Iceland, Hong Kong, and two tours in China as well as in the State Department where he was Chief of China Analysis in its Bureau of Intelligence and Research), May 17, 2007, Heritage Foundation, "China's Quest for a Superpower Military", <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/05/Chinas-Quest-for-a-Superpower-Military>

Moreover, this modernized and sophisticated nuclear force is clearly well in excess of any mere Taiwan contingency. It involves new power projection capabilities that give Beijing two advantages: "area denial" strength, which is achieved by placing forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and Guam at risk, and coercive diplomacy instruments to resolve other territorial disputes, such as in the East China Sea with Japan and the South China Sea with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Indeed, China's new nuclear weapons systems present grave implications for U.S. power projection in the Western Pacific, the security of U.S. allies and friends in democratic Asia, and regional military balances in general.

Rogue Nation Relations Disadvantage

Extension: Major proliferator

Prof. Mohan Malik (PhD, professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu), March 2006, Jamestown Foundation, "China Responds to the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal",

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3939&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1

It is ironic that China—a three-decade long opponent of the NPT and a major nuclear proliferator—is opposing the U.S.-India nuclear civilian energy deal by presenting itself as a great champion of nuclear nonproliferation. Beijing's record of proliferation includes having helped in the development of Pakistan's and North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. China was the last nuclear power to sign the NPT in 1992. Two years after joining the NPT, China transferred 5,000 ring magnets to Islamabad in 1994 to sustain the Pakistani centrifuge operations in a clear violation of the NPT. China is constructing two nuclear power reactors in Pakistan. China has also supplied equipment and materials to Iran for its nuclear and missile programs. Chinese bomb design drawings were recovered from Libya in 2003, and until today the Chinese have not made public the results of their "investigation" launched in February 2004 (China Brief, April 29, 2004).

Nor have the Chinese government and media ever been "worried" about the notorious "Nuclear Bazaar" run by the Pakistani scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan. Given Dr. Khan's close links with and numerous visits to the Chinese nuclear establishment, it is also inconceivable that Chinese security agencies were unaware of Pakistan's nuclear dealings with North Korea, Iran and Libya. Repeated sanctions imposed by the Bush administration against China's state-run companies for engaging in proliferation activities even after Beijing was admitted into the NSG in 2004 indicate that China's liaisons with would-be bomb-makers may have not ended completely. In sharp contrast with the China-Pakistan duo, India never proliferated nuclear weapons material or technology to any other state (despite multi-billion dollars offers from Libya, Iraq, and Taiwan).

Extension: Security threatened from space

John Tkacik, Jr. (MA from Harvard, retired diplomat who served overseas with the U.S. Foreign Service in Taiwan, Iceland, Hong Kong, and two tours in China as well as in the State Department where he was Chief of China Analysis in its Bureau of Intelligence and Research), May 17, 2007, Heritage

Foundation, "China's Quest for a Superpower Military",
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/05/Chinas-Quest-for-a-Superpower-Military>

Since the January 12 test, U.S. media reports from the Pentagon have reflected alarm among U.S. space strategists over several other Chinese space weapon initiatives including ground-based lasers and radio frequency weapons.[39] They are particularly concerned about the launching of small Chinese satellites into orbits very close to key U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications spacecraft. Such parasitic microsattellites are presumed to be time bombs that could blind and cripple American military operations and financial communications. "These things aren't being sent up there to be space rocks," one military source said.[40] All these programs bespeak an anti-satellite development program that is very broad and sophisticated.

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Uniqueness: Russia and China not yet committed to full alliance

John Gordon IV (PhD in public policy from George Mason University, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND) and others, 2008, RAND Corporation, "Domestic Trends in the United States, China, and Iran", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG729.pdf (page 156)

Put simply, the behavior of China and Russia on the military dimension will be determined on a case-by-case basis, with neither side fully committed to institutionalizing this relationship of strategic cooperation.

Response: Don't need an official alliance to hinder US interests

Mark Burles (Master of International Relations, Senior Vice President with Ipsos Public Affairs), June 30, 1999, RAND Corporation, "Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1045/MR1045.chap3.pdf (page 42)

China and Russia need not form an actual alliance for their relationship to cause problems for the United States in a number of international settings. The two countries could complicate U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf by increasing the quantity or quality of weapons sales to countries like Iran, or even Iraq. Of course, this can be done without *any* overt cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. China and Russia might find common cause in opposing U.S. influence in the Korean Peninsula. This would require closer diplomatic and strategic cooperation, but not necessarily an alliance in the formal political and military sense. The two countries can also share intelligence. Access to Russian intelligence resources could be very useful to Beijing during a crisis centered on Taiwan to follow the U.S. defense posture in the region before and during the crisis.

NORTH KOREA

(See General Links for a link)

See also the North Korean Destabilization disadvantage (page 353) for a similar disadvantage.

Link/Brink: Russia has influence with North Korea

Paul J. Saunders (MA in Political Science and MA in Russian and East European Studies, Executive Director of The Nixon Center, former Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs), June 1, 2003, Hoover Institution, Policy Review, "The U.S. and Russia After Iraq", No. 119, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6536>

Washington could attempt to engage the Kremlin more actively in dealing with North Korea's top leadership. President Putin has met Kim Jong-Il several times and seems to have some (admittedly limited) influence with Pyongyang, though Russia's real leverage will probably remain unknown until tested. At a minimum, Putin may be sufficiently trusted by Kim to be credible in explaining the potential consequences of continued recalcitrance by the North.

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Brink: Russian support would help contain North Korea

Paul J. Saunders (MA in Political Science and MA in Russian and East European Studies, Executive Director of The Nixon Center, former Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs), June 1, 2003, Hoover Institution, Policy Review, "The U.S. and Russia After Iraq", No. 119, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6536>

The United States needs less from Russia vis-a-vis North Korea than it does from China, which has a considerably longer border with the North (and probably more leverage over it), or from South Korea and Japan, which Pyongyang most threatens. Yet Russian efforts to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and weapons programs - and active cooperation in isolating Pyongyang until it does so - would be constructive. At a minimum, Moscow's denial of political and other support would limit North Korea's options.

Impact: North Korea is dangerous (examples)

Peter Brookes (MA in government, doctoral candidate at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Fellow for Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation), June 15, 2009, Heritage Foundation, "Rogue States and Rising Powers Continue to Pose a Strategic Risk to American Security", <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/Rogue-States-and-Rising-Powers-Continue-to-Pose-a-Strategic-Risk-to-American-Security>

The number of North Korean provocations just since the beginning of the year has been staggering. On the conventional front, Pyongyang's forward-deployed million-man army could lash out at South Korean and American forces across the DMZ at a moment's notice. This spring, Pyongyang declared that it was no longer bound by the conditions of the 1953 Korean War armistice. On the strategic front, in April, it launched a long-range Taepo Dong ballistic missile with intercontinental-range potential. Pyongyang claimed that the launch was a satellite shot, but experts say that it was a cover for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. Another long-range missile test is expected in the coming weeks.

While walking out of the Six-Party talks aimed at containing North Korea's nuclear ambitions, Pyongyang last month also conducted its second nuclear test in less than three years and reopened a shuttered nuclear facility that could be used to expand its nuclear arsenal. These recent missile and nuclear developments fuel concerns that North Korea is making progress on developing a warhead to fit atop the Taepo Dong ballistic missile that could reach American soil.

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Extension: US-Russian cooperation on North Korea useful

Prof. Goergy D. Toloraya (PhD in economics, professor for the Russian Ministry of Education, former Russian Consul-General to Australia), 2007, Brookings Institution, "Dealing with North Korea: A Russian Perspective", http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/~//media/E04C0816822F45D8B1AAD_EDCF08A582E.ashx (page 3)

Russia, actually still perceived in the DPRK [North Korea] as a continuing state of the USSR - "mother" of the regime - could be useful to the United States on the road to such a solution. Russian capabilities and the goals of Moscow's policies are not fully understood in America and the policy itself is viewed with suspicion. However, Russia's goals in Korea are actually not to increase its influence per se, but to forge a "concert of powers" to ensure peace, demilitarization and creation of prerequisites for development on the neighboring Korean peninsula.

VENEZUELA

Link: US actions push Russia toward Venezuela (Example: bombers)

Rose Gottemoeller (MA, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, former social scientist at RAND, former Council on Foreign Affairs fellow, she specializes in Russian and Eurasian subjects), November 30, 2008, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Russia's Charm Offensive", <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22493>

Gottemoeller explained that Russia's decision to send ships to South America is likely a reaction to the presence of U.S. naval ships in the Black Sea delivering humanitarian aid during the August crisis in Georgia. In addition, Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez - who has industriously built up his country's relations with Russia in recent years in an attempt to challenge the United States - may have played a role in formulating the tour and naval exercises.

Impact: Weapons for terrorists

Stephen J. Blank (PhD in history, Strategic Studies Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989), February 16, 2005, Jamestown Foundation, "WILL VENEZUELA SEND RUSSIAN WEAPONS TO SOUTH AMERICAN TERRORISTS?", http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27560

Chavez turned to Moscow for 40 Mi-35 helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles. Other reports state that Chavez wants to buy 50 MiG-29s, anti-tank weapons, and air defense weapons as well. While Venezuela's arsenals may be obsolete, purchases of this magnitude, plus a reputed desire to buy \$5 billion in weapons from Russia, China, Ukraine, and planes from Brazil by 2010, suggest that Chavez is prey to a megalomania borne of enormous oil revenues and a desire to emulate his mentor Castro. While he certainly has grounds to fear U.S. policy, he and everyone else knows that no invasion is even remotely in the cards. Moreover, there is probably no way Venezuela could even begin to maintain -- or even operate -- this arsenal. Therefore both Washington and Bogota have good reason to fear that these weapons will be given to the FARC or to other terrorists operating in South America, notably Bolivia.

Rogue Nation Relations Disadvantage

ARMING ROGUE STATES

Link: Punitive approach could lead to more anti-US weapons trade

Prof. Alla Kassianova (PhD in historiography, professor of International Relations at Tomsk University in Russia), December 2006, PONARS Policy, "Russian Weapons Sales to Iran: Why They Are Unlikely to Stop", Memo No. 427, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0427.pdf

At the same time, given the ideological undertones of Russia's resurgent defense-industrial capacity and considerable opposition to U.S. foreign policy in many areas around the globe, a punitive approach might only strengthen the already discernible anti-U.S. logic of Russia's weapons export policy.

Brink: Russia willing to sell arms

Ariel Cohen (PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, member of the Council on Foreign Relations), June 27, 2007, Heritage Foundation, "How to Confront Russia's Anti-American Foreign Policy", <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/06/How-to-Confront-Russias-Anti-American-Foreign-Policy>

During his visit to Riyadh, Putin stunned the world by offering to sell "peaceful" nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia. He invited Saudi banks to open wholly owned subsidiaries in Russia and offered 150 T-90 tanks and other weapons. Throughout his Middle East tour, Putin indicated Russia's willing to sell helicopters, build rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) factories, and provide sophisticated anti-aircraft systems (e.g., the Carapace [Pantsyr], TOR M1, and Strelets). He topped off the trip by offering the Saudis expanded satellite launches and an opportunity to join GLONASS, the Russian satellite navigation system.

Impact: Weapons given to terrorists (Syria example)

Ariel Cohen (PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, member of the Council on Foreign Relations), June 27, 2007, Heritage Foundation, "How to Confront Russia's Anti-American Foreign Policy", <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/06/How-to-Confront-Russias-Anti-American-Foreign-Policy>

Although re-establishment of ties between Russia and Syria began in 1998, Syrian President Bashar Assad's January 2005 visit to Moscow proved to be a turning point, as Russia made a decision to write off 73 percent (\$10 billion) of Syria's total debt of \$13.4 billion. A sale of the Strelets air defense missile system was concluded the same year despite protests from Israel and the United States. At the time of the sale, Putin denied Syria's request for more robust air defense missiles, such as S-300 and Igla, and for the short-range ballistic missile Iskander-E, which some analysts interpreted as a demonstration of sensitive to Israeli security concerns.[21] In the meantime, Syria was supplying Hezbollah with Russian weapons. In 2006, Israeli forces found evidence of Russian-made Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank systems in Hezbollah's possession in southern Lebanon.[22] In February 2007, Russia responded to accusations of arming terrorist groups by announcing inspections of Syrian weapons storage facilities with the goal of preventing the weapons from reaching unintended customers.

Rogue Nation Relations Disadvantage

Background: Precedent for arms sales

Ariel Cohen (PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, member of the Council on Foreign Relations), June 27, 2007, Heritage Foundation, "How to Confront Russia's Anti-American Foreign Policy", <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/06/How-to-Confront-Russias-Anti-American-Foreign-Policy>

The Middle East is not a new market for Russian weapons. The Soviet Union armed the region for decades, serving as a major arms supplier to Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, often in exchange for mere promises of future payment. It was this unpaid debt that led to a halt of weapons sales to Syria after the Soviet Union collapsed. Yet 1998-1999 marked the resumption of sales of weapons, such as the AT-14 Kornet-E anti-tank guided missile.